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Abstract
This paper studies the role of bundling in the eﬃcient provision of excludable public goods.
We show that bundling in the provision of unrelated public goods can enhance social welfare.
With a large number of goods and agents, ﬁrst best can be approximated with pure bundling. For
a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we characterize the optimal mechanism,
and show that bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies and increases the
probability of public good provision. Both result are related to the idea that bundling makes
it possible to reduce the number of exclusions because the variance in the relevant valuations
decreases
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Bundling, the practice to package several goods in a bundle rather than providing them sepa-
rately, is a common phenomenon in many markets. Many of the goods that are provided in bundles
are more or less non-rival in consumption. An obvious example is cable TV. Technologically, the
local cable company could allow customers to choose whatever channels they are willing to pay
for without constraints. In practice, the basic pricing scheme usually consists of a limited number
of available packages. While some premium channels and pay-per-view programming are oﬀered
for sale separately, the bundled channels are simply not available in any other way than through
their respective bundles. Another striking example is access to electronic libraries. Here, the typical
contractual arrangement is a site license that allows access to every journal in the electronic library.
While it is sometimes possible to download articles on a pay-per-download basis, this is usually
very expensive, and contracts that gives access to a subset of journals in the electronic library are
rare.
A third example, which was the initial motivation for this paper, is the casual observation that
governmental services are provided in bundles. For example, every resident in a municipality is
entitled to a bundle of public services provided by the local government including policing, highway
maintenance, ﬁre ﬁghting, public schools etc.. Clearly some of the public services in the bundle are
of no value at all for many residents. Why, then, cannot residents only subscribe to their desired
local public services?
Motivated by these examples, this paper studies the role of bundling in the eﬃcient provision of
public goods. We ask a simple question: is there an eﬃciency rationale to provide unrelated public
goods in bundles rather than separately; and if so, why?
We consider an environment with m excludable public goods and a numeraire private good.1
Each consumer is characterized by a valuation for each of the public goods. The willingness to
pay for any subset of the goods is assumed to be the sum of the individual valuations for the
goods consumed. This assumption rules out bundling arising from complementarities in the utility
function. Similarly, the cost of provision of each good is independent of which other goods are
provided. These separability assumptions on valuations and costs imply that the informationally
unconstrained eﬃcient provision rule is as follows: a public good should be provided if and only
if its sum of valuations exceeds its provision cost. Under perfect information there is therefore no
1The term “excludable public goods” refers to a good which is fully non-rival, but where it is possible to costlessly
exclude any consumer from usage.
1role for bundling, and no agent is excluded from any good that is provided.
This paper departs from the perfect information assumption, and assumes that preferences are
private information to the individuals. The provision mechanism must therefore be constructed so
that truthful revelation of preferences is consistent with equilibrium. Agents may also freely choose
whether to participate in the mechanism, and the provision mechanism must be self-ﬁnancing.
Finally, we assume that the preference parameters are stochastically independent across individuals.
Under these restrictions, the (non-bundling) perfect information social optimum can no longer be
implemented.2
Ruling out trivial cases, use exclusions are always active in the constrained eﬃcient mechanism.
Indeed, if the economy is large, use exclusions are essentially the only instruments available to make
consumers willing to contribute a non-negligible amount to the public goods.
To gain intuition, we ﬁrst consider the case where the number of public goods is large, and where
the valuation for all goods are stochastically independent. In this case, a pure bundling mechanism
can approximate the ﬁr s tb e s ti fb o t ht h en u m b e ro fg o o d sa n dt h en u m b e ro fc o n s u m e r si sl a r g e .
This is because the valuation for the average good in the bundle converges in probability to its
expectation. If necessary, the designer can therefore extract almost the full surplus from each
agent. This implies that, while the treat of exclusion still is what supports the incentives, it is
possible to exclude an agent with arbitrarily small probability and still raise enough revenue to
provide all goods. Finally, a large number of agents is needed for approximate eﬃciency because
it is only in a large economy where ex ante information is suﬃcient for the provision decision. If
the number of agents is small, the probability is signiﬁcant that a particular good should not be
provided at all, a consideration that disappears with many agents.
Intuitively, the desirability of bundling in the many good case comes from the fact that bundling
reduces the variance in the distribution of valuations. Whether goods are public or private is irrele-
vant for this. However, unlike the standard setup with private goods, non-rivalness in consumption
means that society can give access to all goods at no additional costs. The desirability of pure
bundling thus relies crucially on the public good assumption.3
2All these restrictions are essential to the analysis. Removing either the voluntary participation or the self-
ﬁnancing constraint makes it possible to construct pivot-mechanisms that implement the ﬁr s t - b e s t .I fw er e m o v et h e
independence assumption and allow correlation in valuations, a version of the analysis in Cremer and McLean [7] can
be used to implement the eﬃcient outcome.
3Armstrong [3] considers a similar many good exercise for private goods. Due to similar law of large numbers
reasoning, a monopolist can extract almost the full consumer surplus. The mechanism is a two part tariﬀ,w h e r e
consumers can pay a ﬁxed fee for the right to purchase any good at marginal cost.
2Next, we turn to a special case where we obtain an exact characterization of the constrained
eﬃcient mechanism. This special case is when there are two public goods, valuations for each good
are binary, and the goods are symmetric both with respects to costs of provision and consumer val-
uations. While this is obviously a very special case, the results are suggestive, and the methodology
may be useful for more general (symmetric) multidimensional screening problems.
There is an element of bundling in the constrained eﬃcient mechanism for almost all parame-
trizations of the model. This should be expected. We know from McAfee et al [13] that introducing
the bundling instrument increases the proﬁts for a monopolist that is restricted to ﬁxed-price mech-
anisms. By results in Norman [18] we also know that, in the case with a single good, the constrained
eﬃcient mechanism is near a ﬁxed price mechanism of the form considered by McAfee et al [13].
Finally, the (single-dimensional) constrained welfare problem has a Lagrangian characterization
(see Hellwig [10] and Norman [18]). This problem may be interpreted as maximizing a weighted
average of social welfare and proﬁts, where the relative weights come from the Lagrange multiplier
on a “zero proﬁt constraint”. Given these links between constrained eﬃciency and a standard
monopoly problem it seems highly plausible that the insight in McAfee et al [13] should carry over
to our problem.
Concretely, bundling works as follows in the optimal mechanism. All agents get access to any
good for which he or she has a high valuation for. A “mixed type” is always more likely to get
access to his or her low-valuation good than is an agent with a low valuation for both goods. In
some cases this diﬀerential treatment leads to a drastic improvement compared to the best that
can be achieved without bundling. For many parametrizations, the probability of provision tends
to zero if bundling is not used, whereas bundling makes it possible to provide with probability one.
It is important to note that, despite the close relationship with the existing literature on bundling
in terms of how bundling relaxes the informational constraints, the public good assumption adds
something new. We derive a constrained eﬃcient mechanism that involve bundling. If we would
make the typical assumption in the literature, that goods are private and produced at constant (or
increasing) marginal costs, our problem would have a trivial solution-marginal cost pricing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and some
characterization results to be used later. In Section 3 we consider the case with a large number
of goods. Section 4 introduces the special case when valuations are binary and demonstrates by
example that a (pure) bundling mechanism may improve eﬃciency. Section 5 characterizes the
optimal mechanism for this special case, and compares our characterization with existing results in
the literature, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
32T h e M o d e l
There are m excludable public goods, labeled by j ∈ J ={1,...,m} and n consumers, indexed
by i ∈ I = {1,...,n}.4 All public goods are indivisible projects, and the cost of providing good j,
denoted by Cj (n), is independent of which of the other goods are provided. Notice here that n is
the size of the economy and not the number of users, so all goods are fully non-rival. The rationale
for indexing cost by the number of agents is to be able to analyze large economies, which makes it
necessary to normalize per capita costs to avoid trivializing the provision problem. We therefore
allow for the existence of cj > 0 such that limn→∞ Cj (n)/n = cj > 0. There is no need to give
this assumption any particular economic interpretation, it is best viewed as a way to ensure that
the provision problem remains “signiﬁc a n t ”a l s ow i t hm a n ya g e n t s .
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i − ti, (1)
where I
j
i is a dummy variable taking value 1 when i consumes good j and 0 otherwise, and ti is
the quantity of the numeraire good transferred from i to the mechanism designer. Preferences over
lotteries are of expected utility form. One could obviously imagine more general utility functions
t h a n( 1 ) ,b u tt h el i n e a rf o r m u l a t i o n( w h i c hi sa l s ou s e db yA d a m sa n dY e l l e n[ 1 ] ,M c A f e ee t
al [13], and Manelli and Vincent [12]) has the advantage that it rules out bundling arising due to
complementarities in preferences.
The preference vector θi is private information to the agent, and we assume that preferences
are independently and identically distributed across agents. We denote by F the joint cumulative
distribution over θi. For brevity of notation, we let θ ≡ (θ1,...,θn), which will be referred to as
a type proﬁle,a n dl e tΘ ≡ (Θ)
n . In the usual fashion, we let θ−i =( θ1,..,θi−1,θ i+1,...θn) and,
with some abuse of notation, we write F(θ) ≡ Πi∈IF (θi) and F(θ−i) ≡ Πk∈I\iF (θk) as the joint
distribution of θ and θ−i respectively.
2.1 Randomized Direct Mechanisms
In general, the outcome of any mechanism must determine: (1). which goods, if any, should be
provided; (2). who are to be given access to the goods that are provided, and; (3). how to share
4There are two reasons for allowing use exclusions. It allows use to consider large economies, which aids tractability.
Moreover, it allows for a more intuitive form of bundling, since diﬀerent consumers can consume diﬀerent bundles
when exclusions are possible.















By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms for which truth-telling is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A pure direct mechanism is simply a map from Θ to A. We represent
a randomized mechanism in analogy with the representation of mixed strategies in Aumann [4].
That is, let X =[ 0 ,1], and think of x ∈ X as the outcome of a ﬁctitious lottery, where, without
loss of generality, x is uniformly distributed and independent of θ. A random direct mechanism is
then a measurable mapping G : Θ × X → A. A conceptual advantage of this formalization of a
random mechanism is that it allows for a useful decomposition.5 That is, we may write G as a







ζj : Θ × X → {0,1}
ωj : Θ × X → {0,1}
n (3)
τ : Θ → Rn.
We refer to ζj as the provision rule for good j, and interpret EXζj (θ,x) as the probability of








is referred to as the inclusion rule for
good j, and EXω
j
i (θ,x) is interpreted as the probability that agent i gets access to good j when
announcements are θ, conditional on good j being provided. Finally, τ =( τ1,...,τn) is referred
to as the cost-sharing rules, where τi (θ) is the transfer from agent i to the mechanism designer
given announced valuations θ. In principle, transfers could also be randomized, but, agents are risk
neutral with respect to transfers, so there are no gains from this. The pure transfer rule in (3) is
therefore without loss of generality.
Because of the separability of the provision costs and the linear utility functions in (1) the




i ≥ Cj (n) and never exclude any consumer from usage when the good is provided. This is
exactly as if each good j would be the only public good.
5Because A is ﬁnite, there are no technical reasons. The representation is chosen only because it generates
more convenient notation than either the “natural” representation or the “distributional approach” of Milgrom and
Weber [14].
52.2 The Design Problem
Utility is transferable, so we can characterize the constrained eﬃcient allocation rules as the
solution to a planning problem. A ﬁctitious social planner seeks to maximize total surplus in the
economy, subject incentive compatibility, feasibility, and participation constraints. Let E−i denote
the expectation operator with respect to (θ−i,x). Incentive compatibility, that is, the requirement





















i − τi(b θi,θ −i)

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∀i ∈ I,θ∈ Θ,b θi ∈ Θ. (4)












 ≥ 0. (5)
Finally, we require that a voluntary participation, or individual rationality, condition is satisﬁed.
Agents are assumed to know their own type, but not the realized types of the other agents, when












 ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,θi ∈ Θ. (6)
A mechanism is incentive feasible if it satisﬁes (4), (5) and (6). A mechanism is constrained eﬃcient











i − Cj (n)
#
, (7)
over all incentive feasible mechanisms.
All these constraints are noncontroversial if thinking about the design problem as a private
bargaining agreement, but, in particular the participation constraints (6), may seem questionable if
6The ex ante constraint (5) is literally relevant only when the designer can access fair insurance market against
budget deﬁcits. However, adapting standard arguments (see Mailath and Postlewaite [11] and Cramton et al [6])
one shows any allocation implementable with transfers satisfying (5) is implementable also with a transfer rule that
satisﬁes the ex post balanced-budget constraint (i.e. feasibility for every realization of θ) that implements the same
allocation. The idea is simply that, since agents is risk-neutral, the insurance against budget deﬁcits can be provided
by one or more of the agents in the economy.
6interpreting the goods as government provided. One defense in this context is that the participation
constraint is a reduced form of an environment where agents may vote with their feet (ignoring
that the reservation utility then should be endogenous).7
If preferences are observable, or if either (5) or (6) are ignored, the (non-bundling) ex post
eﬃcient mechanism is implementable. As discussed above, the ex post eﬃcient provision rule for
good j ignores the valuations for all other goods and excludes nobody. The ex post eﬃcient rule
is therefore implementable if and only if a single non-excludable public good can be eﬃciently
provided under (4),5) or (6). But, this is the exact setup of Mailath and Postlewaite [11], and
from their adaption of Myerson and Satterthwaites’ [16] impossibility result we know that ﬁrst best
eﬃciency is only possible in trivial cases. Our setup is therefore a second best problem.
2.3 Simple Anonymous Mechanisms
To simplify the problem, we ﬁrst exploit that all control variables enter linearly in both the
constraints and the objective function and the symmetry of the problem. This allows us to reduce
the dimensionality of the problem:







j∈J ,t) where for each j ∈ J,
ρj : Θ → [0,1]
ηj : Θ → [0,1] (8)
t : Θ → R,
where ρj is the provision rule for good j, ηj is the inclusion rule for good j (same for all agents),
and t i st h et r a n s f e rr u l e( a l s ot h es a m ef o re a c ha g e n t s ) .
There are a number of simpliﬁcations in (8) relative to (3):
1. Inclusion and transfer rules are the same for all agents.





k∈J , and all inclusion probabilities.
3. The inclusion and transfer rules for any agent i are independent of the realization of θ−i.
7Another defense of imposing voluntary participation in the context of government provided goods is to view this
as a reduced form for inequality aversion of the planner. See Hellwig [9].
74. All agents are treated symmetrically in terms of the transfer and inclusion rules.
Symmetry in inclusion and transfer rules is built into the notion of a simple mechanism, but (8)
still allows asymmetric treatment in the provision rules. We therefore need a deﬁnition to express
what it means for the index of the agent to be irrelevant:
Deﬁnition 2 A simple mechanism is called anonymous if ρj (θ)=ρj ¡
θ0¢
for every j ∈ J, every
θ ∈ Θ, and every θ0 ∈ Θ that can be obtained from θ by permuting the indices of the agents
We now show that focusing on simple anonymous mechanisms is without loss of generality:
Proposition 1 For any incentive feasible mechanism G of the form (3), there exists an anonymous
simple incentive feasible mechanism g of the form (8) that generates the same social surplus.
Consequently, the remainder of this paper only considers simple anonymous mechanisms. The
intuition for why this class of mechanisms are suﬃcient is simple. Because of the risk neutrality,
all agents care about is the perceived probability of consuming each public good and the expected
transfer. Therefore, there is nothing to gain from making transfers and inclusion probabilities
functions of θ−i , or by making inclusion and provision rules conditionally dependent. Mechanisms
of the form (8) are therefore suﬃcient. Moreover, from any incentive feasible mechanism, one
can always create a new incentive feasible mechanism that generates the same social surplus by
permuting the roles of the agents. There are n! permuted mechanisms, and from these we can
create an anonymous incentive feasible mechanism that generates the same surplus by averaging
over the n! permutations.8
2.4 Symmetric Treatment of the Goods
Our next result, which we rely heavily in Sections 4 and 5, identiﬁes conditions for when it
is without loss of generality to treat goods symmetrically. Obviously, the underlying environment
must be symmetric, and we formalize this by assuming that θi is an exchangeable random variable,






i is a permutation of θi, and that there exists C (n) such that
Cj (n)=C (n) for all j.
8The exact argument is slightly more complex than simply randomizing with equal probabilities over the n!
permutations. The reason is that inclusion and provision probabilities are potentially correlated since they both
depend on θi ∈ Θi.
8The notion of symmetric mechanisms is intuitive, but we nevertheless provide a formal deﬁnition
for clarity. Given valuation proﬁle θ and a permutation P : J → J of the set of goods, let θP
i denote












, where P−1 denote the inverse of P.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w r i t eθP for
the valuation proﬁle obtained when the role of the goods is changed in accordance to P for every
i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 3 Mechanism g is symmetric if for every θ and every permutation P : J → J :
1. ρP−1(j) ¡
θP¢












Symmetry is only a meaningful concept when the role of the goods are permuted in the same
way for all agents. To see this, suppose there are two agents and two goods, and that the valuation
for each good is either h or l. In this case Θ = {(h,h),(h,l),(l,h),(l,l)}. One type proﬁle in Θ
is θ =( ( h,l),(l,h)). The only permutation of the goods generates type proﬁle ((l,h),(h,l)). If we
allow for diﬀerent permutations for the two agents, one possible “permutation” of ((h,l),(l,h)) is
((h,l),(h,l)), which is a rather diﬀerent situation, since both agents have a low valuation for one
of the goods under the original type proﬁle, while the agents have a high valuation for the same
good under ((h,l),(h,l)).
The result is:
Proposition 2 Suppose that θi is an exchangeable random variable and that there exists C (n)
such that Cj (n)=C (n) for all j. Then, for any incentive feasible (simple anonymous) mechanism
g there exists an incentive feasible symmetric (simple anonymous) mechanism that generates the
same surplus as g.
The idea of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, except that it now is the role of
the goods that are permuted. For concreteness, think about the case with two goods. It is then
straightforward to conceptualize what it means to reverse the roles of the goods, which results
in an alternative mechanism that generates the same surplus. Averaging over the original and
the reversed mechanism (provision probabilities and taxes are given by straightforward averaging,
but since inclusion and provision probabilities may be correlated the procedure is somewhat more
9involved for the inclusion rules) one obtains a symmetric mechanism that is incentive feasible and
generates the same surplus. Proposition 2 generalizes this procedure by permuting the roles of the
goods (m! possibilities) and creating a symmetric mechanism by averaging over these.
3 The Case with Many Independent Goods
A relatively straightforward case is when both the number of goods and the number of agents
is large. For reasons familiar from the multidimensional screening literature, ﬁnding an exactly
optimal mechanism is an intractable problem. However, using reasoning similar to Armstrong
[3], one can construct an approximately optimal mechanism for the case when both n and m is
suﬃciently large.9 This approximately optimal mechanism is a pure bundling mechanism.




i ≥ Cj (n) and exclude
nobody from usage. What is the provision probability for good j under the ex post eﬃcient rule?
Given that there exists ﬁnite numbers µ and σ2 such that Eθ
j
i ≤ µ and Varθ
j
i ≤ σ2 for each j,w h i c h





i/n converges in probability to Eθ
j
i,a n dt h ee xp o s te ﬃcient provision
probability converges to either zero or one depending on the relation between Eθ
j
i and Cj (n)/n :
Lemma 1 Suppose there are ﬁnite numbers µ and σ2 such that Eθ
j
i ≤ µ and Varθ
j
i ≤ σ2 and;
1. if, in addition, there exists N and δ>0 such that Eθ
j





i ≥ Cj (n)
i
=1
2. if, in addition, there exists N and δ>0 such that Cj (n)/n − Eθ
j





i ≥ Cj (n)
i
=0
It is not hard to implement “never provide” , so only the ﬁrst case is interesting. We therefore
assume that the ﬁrst case applies for all j for the remainder of this section.11 Also note that if
Cj (n)/n has a limit, the only case not covered in Lemma 1 is when limn→∞ Cj (n)/n =E θ
j
i.
9While containing no formal large numbers analysis, similar reasoning can also be found in Dana [8].
10As u ﬃcient condition for the existence of the bounds µ and σ
2 is that there exists an interval [a,b] such that
Θ
j
i ⊂ [a,b] for every j.
11If the ﬁrst best probability of provision converges to one for some goods and zero for others, the analysis still
a p p l i e sa sl o n ga st h e r ea r es u ﬃciently many goods that should be provided in a large economy according to the ex
post eﬃcient rule. Goods for which the ﬁrst best probability of provision converges to zero may simply be dropped
from the bundle and the rest of the analysis carries over.



























































The mechanism in (9) is a pure bundling mechanism. While expressed as a direct revelation mech-





n + εm. Clearly, truth-telling is a dominant strategy and the participation
constraints are satisﬁed given such a mechanism. The only questions are thus; i) when does (9)
satisfy the feasibility constraint (5)?; and, ii) what are the optimality properties of (9)?





σ2 for every j, and Eθ
j
i − Cj (n)/n ≥ δ for every j and n ≥ N. Then;
(1) for any ε ∈ (0,δ) there exists M<∞ such that b g is incentive feasible for any n and any m
such that n ≥ N and m ≥ M,
(2) for every ε ∈ (0,δ) there exists Nε and M (independent of ε) such that the diﬀerence in per
capita surplus between the ex post optimal mechanism and mechanism b g is less than ε for any
economy with n ≥ Nε and m ≥ M.
In words, the simple pure bundling mechanism in (9) can approximate the outcome of the infor-
mationally unconstrained eﬃcient mechanism arbitrarily well, provided that the number of goods
and the number of consumers are both suﬃciently large. In contrast, if the bundling instrument is
not available, the probability of exclusion is always bounded away from zero for all agents (see Nor-
man [18]). The result thus illustrates that (pure) commodity bundling improves economic eﬃciency
in large economies with many public goods.
The intuition for the above “double inﬁnity” (n and m both go to inﬁnity) asymptotic results
is as follows. By selling usage of the goods only as a bundle, a consumer will buy the good if and
only if the average valuation exceeds the ratio of the price over the number of goods. The average
valuation converges almost surely to the expectation as the number of goods approach inﬁnity,
implying that the probability of excluding an agent can be made negligible even if the “per good”
bundle price is near the expected average valuation. Hence, what is crucial for the implementability
of b g is the number of goods. Indeed, if Cj (n)=cjn for each j and n, the number of agents is
11completely irrelevant for part 1 of the result. However, the number of agents play a crucial role for
the desirability of the pure bundling scheme. With a small number of agents, there is a signiﬁcant
probability that a particular good should not be provided. If n is large, this probability is negligible,
implying that the pure bundling provision rule is near the eﬃcient provision rule.
Independence between the elements in θi is of course a strong assumption. In many situations it
seems reasonable that there are correlations, for example due to all elements in θi being correlated
with wealth, age, or other “background variables”. But, if the variables that induce the correlation
are observable, this can easily been taken care of. That is, if (θi,z) follows some joint distribution
F, what is needed is that the elements in θi are conditionally independent given any realized z.12
3.1 What is Special About Public Goods?
It is instructive to compare our large numbers analysis with the analysis of a multi-product
monopolist (selling private goods) in Armstrong [3]. While Armstrong is concerned with proﬁt
maximization, he obtains an approximate full surplus extraction result when there is a large number
of stochastically independent goods, so the allocation is almost ﬁrst best. The mechanism that
achieves this is a two part tariﬀ. In essence, the monopolist sells the right to purchase goods at
marginal cost. With a large number of goods, the consumer surplus for the average good is near
the expected consumer surplus, so the monopolist can extract almost the full surplus.
A pure bundling scheme would not do particularly well when selling private goods. Unless
the marginal cost is zero, pure bundling would lead to a large numbers of goods being produced
for users who value the goods below cost. Non-rivalness in consumption means that this concern
vanishes, and bundling can almost implement ﬁrst best.
4 The Model with Binary Valuations
We now turn to a case for which we can characterize the constrained eﬃcient mechanism exactly.
Assume that there are two public goods, and that the valuation for good j can either be “high”
(θ
j
i = h)o r“ l o w ”( θ
j
i = l). The individual type space is thus Θ = {(h,h),(h,l),(l,h),(l,l)}. For
notational brevity we henceforth write θi = hh instead of (h,h),θ i = hl instead of (h,l), and so
on. To facilitate comparisons with the non-bundling benchmark, we also assume that θ1
i and θ2
i are
independent with α =P r [ θ1
i = h]=P r [ θ2
i = h] ∈ (0,1), implying that the probability distribution
12If for each i, Fi is the cdf over θi and {Fi}
n
i=1 are independent, mechanism (9) still leads to approximate eﬃciency.
12F over Θ is:13
n




Finally, we assume that costs are given by C1 (n)=C2 (n)=cn. The most important simpliﬁcation
here is that costs are the same for both goods. Together with the symmetric type space, this implies
that we can appeal to Proposition 2 and restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. Keeping the
per capita costs constant simpliﬁes notation, but is not necessary.
If h ≤ c “never provide any good” is ex post optimal, which can be trivially implemented.
Symmetrically, if l ≥ c “always provide both goods” is ex post optimal and can be implemented by
charging a constant tax equal to 2c. We therefore maintain the assumption that l<c<hin order
to keep the problem interesting.
Appealing to Propositions 1 and 2, we consider only simple anonymous mechanisms that treat
the two public goods symmetrically. For each θ ∈ Θ ≡ {hh,hl,lh,ll}
n , let x ≡ (xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll)




4 : xhh + xhl + xlh + xll = n
o
. (10)
be the set of possible values of x in an economy with n agents. Anonymity means that the provision
rule depends only on the number of agents who announce diﬀerent valuation combinations. With
















4 and t =( thh,t hl,t lh,t ll) ∈ R4 satisfy









ll,t hl = tlh. (12b)
4.1 Optimal Separate Provision Mechanisms
As a benchmark, this section derives the asymptotic provision probabilities of the two public
goods when the provision problem for each public good is considered in isolation. Proposition 1
applies also to the case with a single good, which for the binary case means that the provision
rule may be taken to depend only on the number of agents who announce a high valuation. To
13While independence across agents is absolutely crucial for the analysis, independence across goods is not. The









where σ(m) is the probability of a “mixed type”.
13emphasize that the solution depends on the size of the economy we index the mechanism by n.







n),w h e r eρ
j
n : {1,...,n} → [0,1] and ρ
j
n (m) denotes the probability of provision if m
agents announce a high valuation for good j; η
j







n(l)) are the transfers.14
To ﬁnd the best provision mechanism where goods are provided separately is formally the same
problem as ﬁnding the best provision mechanism when there is only a single good. Maximizing
social surplus subject to the single-good analogues of (4), (5) and (6) in Section 2.2 one obtains
the following characterization of the constrained optimal separate provision mechanism:
Proposition 4 Consider a sequence of economies of size {n}
∞
n=1 . Then;
(1) if αh < c,limn→∞ Eρ
j











(2) if αh > c,limn→∞ Eρ
∗j


































The result is a two-type analogue to Propositions 2 and 3 in Norman [18] and the ideas are very
similar.15 Instead of a formal proof, we only provide a heuristic explanation of the result.16 The

















n h − t∗j
n (l), (13)
may be replaced by
Eρ∗j
n (m)h − t∗j
n (h) ≥ Eρ∗j
n (m)η∗j
n h − t∗j
n (l), (14)
since the probability that agent i is pivotal for the provision decision is negligible in a large economy.
Moreover, the participation constraint for the low type binds, and (again ignoring the eﬀects of being
14In principle, use exclusions of type h agents is of course also feasible. However, such exclusions never occur in an
optimal mechanism, since excluding type h tightens the downwards incentive constraint for h.
15Strictly speaking, Proposition 4 is not a special case of the results in Norman [18], which deals with continuous
distributions satisfying the “increasing virtual valuation condition” familiar from Myerson [15] and others. Since
continuous approximations of discrete distributions violate this regularity condition, there are some qualitative dif-
ferences between the binary case and the “regular” continuously distributed case. In particular, the solution to the
binary case will generically involve randomizations.
16Details available on request from the authors.
14pivotal) this implies that t
∗j




n l. Because the (13) binds in the optimal mechanism,
budget balance requires that, approximately,
Eρ∗j
n (m)c = αt∗j
n (h)+( 1− α)t∗j





























n ≈ (αh − c)/(αh − l) follows from (15). Inspecting (15), it follows that limn→∞Eρ
∗j
n (m)=
0 if αh < c (since l<cby assumption). Otherwise the budget balance constraint must be violated
for large n. On the other hand, if αh > c, it is feasible to provide for sure (for any n) with the
transfers speciﬁed in Proposition 4, and inclusion probability η∗
∞ ≡ (αh − c)/(αh − l). Condi-
tional on this inclusion probability, the ex post eﬃcient rule is to provide public good j whenever
m
n h + n−m
n η∗











= αh +( 1− α)
αh − c
αh − l
l>α h>c . (16)
Thus, the ex post eﬃcient provision rule conditional on the given inclusion probability converges
towards “always provide”. Hence limn→∞ Eρ
∗j
n (m)=1in the optimal mechanism. The limits for
the transfers can then be obtained by substituting limn→∞ Eρ
∗j
n (m)=1back into the incentive
and participation constraints.
The optimal separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 4 is bounded away from
ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃciency. First of all, the asymptotic provision probability is zero when αh < c while
eﬃciency requires that the public good be provided whenever αh +( 1− α)l>c .Moreover, when
αh > c, there is still a distortion due to positive probability of exclusion of low valuation agents,
even though the public good is provided asymptotically with probability 1
4.2 Eﬃciency Gains From Bundling
Before deriving the constrained optimal mechanism, we consider an example that shows that
bundling can lead to provision for sure, even though the best separate provision mechanism has an
asymptotic provision probability equal to zero.
Suppose that αh +( 1− α)l>c , so that provision is desirable in a large economy with a
probability near one. Consider mechanism
thh = thl = tlh = h + l, and tll =0 (17)
ηhh = ηhl = ηlh =1 , and ηll =0
ρ1 (x)=ρ2 (x)=1for all x ∈ X.
15That is, type hh and the mixed types are taxed the willingness to pay of the mixed type and get
both goods for sure. Type ll pays nothing and is excluded from usage from both goods.
All incentive and participation constraints are trivially satisﬁed given mechanism (17). The
only question is thus whether the feasibility constraint (5) is satisﬁed, that is, if
Pr[{hh,hl,lh}](h + l)=α(2 − α)(h + l) ≥ 2c, (18)
holds. It is easy to show that:
Claim 1 Given any c>0 and α ∈ (0,1) there exists pairs (h,l) with h>c>lsuch that (18) is
satisﬁed, where at the same time ah < c.
The expected utility in the best separate provision mechanism approaches zero for all agents
when provisions go to zero, whereas type hh enjoys utility level h − l>0 under mechanism (17).
The proposed bundling mechanism therefore improves eﬃciency. The construction of the values of
h and l for any c>0 for which (17) outperforms the best mechanism without bundling is depicted
in Figure 1. The intuition for the improvement of bundling mechanism is as follows. The revenue
maximizing mechanism without bundling is to include only high valuation types. Hence, a fraction
α of the agents contribute towards each good. In the bundling mechanism (17), only a fraction
(1 − α)
2 are excluded. While the contribution per agent decreases, the total revenue increases if l
is suﬃciently close to c.
5 The Constrained Optimal Mechanism
5.1 The Mechanism Design Problem
For the binary model described in the previous section, we now set up the design problem to
maximize social surplus (7) subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (4), the feasibility
constraint (5) and the participation constraints (6) in a tractable form.
The most involved part of the optimization problem is the provision rule This is somewhat diﬃ-
cult to deal with because ρj (x) is weighted by the ex ante probability that x occurs in the objective
function to the problem, while the relevant probabilities in the constraints are conditional proba-
bilities. To deal with this, we need to be explicit about the (multinomial) probability distribution
of x, in order to eventually be able to link the unconditional and conditional probabilities. Given
n agents, we denote the probability of outcome x ∈ Xn by an (x), which follows a multinomial with
parameters
³



















































αh +( 1− α) l = c
Figure 1: The Bundling Mechanism Outperforms Optimal Non-bundling Mechanism in the Shaded Region.
There are 12 incentive constraints to be satisﬁed. However, due to the symmetry, types are
naturally ordered as hh being the “highest type”, hl and lh being “middle types” and ll being
the “lowest type”. We therefore conjecture that only downwards incentive constraints are relevant
and will therefore ignore all upwards constraints as well as the constraints between type hl and
lh. Once the solution to the relaxed problem is fully characterized, we will verify that the other
omitted constraints are satisﬁed. Finally, it is easy to check that if hh is better oﬀ announcing
her true type than type hl and hl is better oﬀ announcing her true type than ll, then there are no
incentives for hh to announce ll. Together with the symmetry of the mechanism (12), we are thus

























x∈Xn−1 an−1 (x)ρ1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll +1 )( h + l) − tll,
(19b)
where (19a) states that type-hh agents do not have incentives to mis-report as type hl; and (19b)
states that type-hl agents do not have incentives to mis-report as type ll.
Given that all downward incentive constraints and the participation constraint for type ll are
17fulﬁlled it follows by a standard argument that the participation constraints for types hh,hl and





an−1 (x)ρ1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll +1 ) l − tll ≥ 0. (20)
Finally, the budget balance constraint can be simpliﬁed considerably due to the simple transfer
schemes and the constant per capita costs. That is, using the symmetry of (12) and breaking out
n from (5) we can express the feasibility constraint in per capita form as
α2thh + α(1 − α)2thl +( 1− α)
2 tll − 2c
X
x∈Xn
an (x)ρ1 (x) ≥ 0. (21)
























s.t. (19a)-(19b), (20) and (21),
η1
θi ≥ 0,1 − η1
θi ≥ 0 for each θi ∈ Θ, (23)
ρ1 (x) ≥ 0,1 − ρ1 (x) ≥ 0 for each x ∈ Xn, (24)
where the social planner’s objective function is written in per capita form.
Lemma 2 There exists at least one optimal solution to (22).
The proof is standard by ﬁrst compactifying the constraint set and then applying Weierstrass
Theorem. It can be shown that Slater’s’ condition for constraint qualiﬁcation holds, so the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are necessary for an optimum. Since a solution to (22) exists, these ﬁrst order
conditions therefore provide a characterization of the optimal mechanism, provided that the con-
straints that we ignored when formulating (22) are satisﬁed at the candidate solution.
5.2 Relationship Between Multipliers
Taxes enter linearly into all constraints and are not constrained by boundaries. It is therefore
convenient to begin the analysis by taking ﬁrst order conditions with respect to tθ. This allows us
to express the multiplier of any other constraint as a linear scaling of the multiplier of the feasibility
constraint.
17The multiplicative constant 2 in the objective function is redundant, but it aids interpretations by keeping the
units in the objective function and the constraints comparable.
18The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to t =( thh,t hl,t ll) are,
(w.r.t. thh) −λhh + Λα2 =0 ,
(w.r.t. thl) λhh + λhl + Λ2α(1 − α)=0 ,
(w.r.t. tll) λhl − λll + Λ(1 − α)
2 =0 .
, (25)
where λhh and λhl are the multipliers associated with (incentive compatibility) constraints (19a)
and (19b), and λll is the multiplier associated with the (participation) constraint (20). Hence:
Lemma 3 In any solution to (22) the multipliers (λhh,λ hl,λ ll,Λ) satisfy: λhh = α2Λ,λ hl =
¡
2α − α2¢
Λ, and λll = Λ.
In all its simplicity, Lemma 3 is actually a key step in the solution of (22). Its role is similar to
the characterization of incentive compatibility and individual rationality in terms of a single integral
constraint in single-dimensional mechanism design problem (i.e., the approach in Myerson [15] and
others). In multidimensional problems, it is impossible to collapse all constraints into a single
constraint. Instead, Lemma 3 allows us to indirectly relate all optimality conditions to a single
constraint. The analysis is thus very much as if an objective function is maximized subject to a
single constraint.
5.3 Optimal Inclusion Rules
We now characterize the optimal inclusion rules η1. To ease the statement of the result, we
deﬁne two linear functions G :[ 0 ,1] → R and H :[ 0 ,1] → R as





















Lemma 4 Let M =( ρ1,ρ 2,η1,η2,t) be a symmetric solution to (22) and let Φ = Λ/(1 + Λ),

















1 if G(Φ) > 0
y ∈ [0,1] if G(Φ)=0







1 if H (Φ) > 0
y ∈ [0,1] if H (Φ)=0
0 if H (Φ) < 0.
To interpret the result, note that Φ = Λ/(1 + Λ) ∈ [0,1], and G(Φ) ≥ 0 if and only if
(1 − Φ)
Term 1 z }| {
α(1 − α)2l + Φ
Term 2 z }| { £
α(2 − α)l − α2h
¤
≥ 0. (27)





ll =0 , in which case agent i is given access to good j if and only if her
announced valuation for good j is h. Since high valuation agents are willing to pay h for access to
a good, the expected revenue from such an inclusion rule is at most 2h×α2+h×2α(1 − α)=2 αh




ll =0 , which states
that an agent is given access to both goods as long as one of her announced valuation is high. Under
this inclusion rule, all agent types except ll could be charged h + l for access to both goods. This
results in an expected revenue per agent of at least
£
α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤
(h + l)=α(2 − α)(h + l).
The change in revenue if increasing η1
lh and η2
hl from 0 to 1 is thus
α(2 − α)(h + l) − α2h = α(2 − α)l − α2h,
which is term 2 in expression (27). Term 1 in expression (27), 2α(1 − α)l, on the other hand,
captures the marginal increase in per capita surplus from increasing η1
lh and η2
hl from 0 to 1. In
sum, this means that G(Φ) is a weighted average of the optimality conditions for an unconstrained
social planner and a proﬁt maximizing provider, where the weight on term 2 — the eﬀect on revenue
— is higher when the shadow price of revenue, namely, Λ, is higher.
Clearly, if both term 1 and term 2 are positive, then both the social planner and monopolistic
provider prefers setting η1
lh = η2
hl =1 . On the other hand, if term 2 is negative, i.e. if α(2 − α)l<







lh > 0 but Φ∗
lh < 1 only when α(2 − α)l<α 2h. That is, when there is a conﬂict of
interest between the surplus maximizing social planner and a revenue maximizing monopolistic
provider, η1
lh = η2
hl =1w i l lb eo p t i m a lo n l yw h e nΛ, or the shadow price of resources is suﬃciently
low. To summarize, item 2 of Lemma 4 could be restated as: there exists a critical value Φ∗
lh ∈ (0,1)
such that G(Φ) ≥ 0 if and only if Φ ≤ Φ∗
lh.
20Analogously, H (Φ) ≥ 0 if and only if
(1 − Φ)(1− α)
2 2l + Φ[2l − α(2 − α)(h + l)] ≥ 0.
The term (1 − α)
2 2l i st h eg a i ni ns o c i a ls u r p l u sw h e nη1
ll and η2
ll are increased from 0 to 1; and
the term 2l − α(2 − α)(h + l) is the revenue eﬀe c to fs u c hac h a n g e . T h u s ,H (Φ) is again a
the optimality conditions for an unconstrained social planner and a proﬁt maximizing provider. If
2l−α(2 − α)(h + l) > 0, the H (Φ) > 0 for sure and η1
ll = η2
ll =1is optimal. Otherwise, H (Φ) ≥ 0
















This implies that type-hl or type-lh agents are always “ﬁrst in line” to get access to the good
for which they have a low valuation in the following sense: if η1
ll = η2





hl =1 ;symmetrically, if η1
lh = η2





ll =0 . We summarize the above discussion as:




> 0 for all θi ∈ Θ and j =1 ,2. Let Φ = Λ/(1 + Λ).T h e
optimal inclusion rule satisﬁes:
1. All agents with a high valuation for good j is included with probability one for using good j if
it is provided;
2. If Φ < Φ∗
ll < Φ∗
lh, then all agents get access to both public goods.




























While Λ is still unknown, we now possess a simple characterization of the optimal inclusions as
a function of the still unknown multiplier on the resource constraint.
215.4 Optimal Provision Rules


















































These functions have a natural interpretation. To see this, ﬁrst consider the case where Φ =0 ,i n
which case (see deﬁnitions in (26)) G(Φ)=H (Φ)=2 l. The value of Qj (x/n,0) is thus simply
the social surplus generated if good j is provided and nobody is excluded. Similarly, as discussed
in the previous section, G(1) is the gain or loss in revenue if mixed types are allowed to consume
their low valuation good.18 We can thus think of Qj (x/n,Φ) as a weighted average social surplus
and net revenue if the good is provided when the state is x.
The constrained optimal provision rule can be fully described in terms of these two functions:
Lemma 6 Let M be an optimal solution to (22) and Φ = Λ/(1 + Λ) where Λ is the multi-
plier associated with the constraint (21) at the optimal solution. Then, (1) ρj (x)=1whenever
Qj (x/n,Φ) > 0, and, (2) ρj (x)=0whenever Qj (x/n,Φ) < 0.
To summarize, we have characterized the optimal inclusion and provision rules for any given
value of the Lagrange multiplier Λ associated with the feasibility constraint. Such characterization
provides some partial information regarding the asymptotic provision probability in the optimal
mechanism with bundling. For example, the above characterization tells us that αh > c is a
suﬃcient but not necessary condition for the provision probability to converge to one.19 In contrast,
in the model without bundling, αh > c is the necessary and suﬃcient for asymptotic probability one
provision. To see this, write µ =
³
α2,α(1 − α),α(1 − α),(1 − α)
2
´
as the asymptotic proportions
of agents with diﬀerent valuation combinations hh,hl,lh, and ll; and write Φn = Λn/(1 + Λn) where
Λn is the associated multiplier on the resource constraint in the optimal solution when the number








= αh + α(1 − α)max{0,G(Φ)} +(1− α)
2 max{0,H(Φ)} − c (29)
18T h es a m ei st r u ea b o u tH (Φ), but given the non-triviality assumptions on the problem, giving access to type ll
always reduces revenue.
19Recall that in the example in Section 4.2, the proposed bundling mechanism achieves provision with probability
one for cases when αh < c.
22where Φ =l i m n→∞ Φn. Thus, αh > c is a suﬃcient condition for Qj (µ,Φ) > 0 (and hence for
asymptotic provision with probability 1).
5.5 The Main Result
In this section, we provide a full characterization of the asymptotic provision probability in




























are the probabilities that type-hl and ll agents are allowed access to good 2
conditional on provision; and tn is the transfer rule. Note that we have used our result from Lemma










be a sequence of optimal mechanism. Then, the following holds:
1. if max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} > 2c, then limn→∞ Eρ
j
n (x) → 1 for j =1 ,2;
2. if max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} < 2c, then limn→∞ Eρ
j
n (x) → 0 for j =1 ,2;
3. if α(2 − α)(h + l) > 2c, then there exists N<∞ such that η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl)=1for every
n ≥ N, η1
n (ll)=η2
n (ll) for every n and
lim
n→∞η1







α(2 − α)(h + l) − 2c
α(2 − α)(h + l) − 2l
∈ (0,1);
4. If 2αh > 2c>α(2 − α)(h + l),then there exists N<∞ such that η1
n (ll)=η2
n (ll)=0for all
n ≥ N and η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl) for every n and
lim
n→∞η1








2α2h − α(2 − α)(h + l)
∈ (0,1).
Hence, in some cases provisions occur when it would not be feasible to provide without bundling.
Moreover, comparing aggregate inclusions with the case with separate provisions (in which case
inclusion probability is (αh − c)/(αh − l)) we see that exclusions are reduced.









n → 0, if αh < c
Eρ
j∗















if max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} > 2c
(This Paper)
Table 1: The Asymptotic Provision Probability under Diﬀerent Bundling and Exclusion Possibilities.
5.6 Summary
In Sections 4 and 5, we studied the optimal bundling mechanism in an environment with n
agents and two public goods. Each agent’s valuations for the public goods are independent and
take values h and l with probability α and 1−α respectively. Suppose that the per capita provision
cost of each public good is c ∈ (l,h). Table 1 summarizes our results and the existing results in
the literature with diﬀerent possibilities of bundling and exclusion. The eﬃciency rationale for the
bundling in the provision of excludable public goods is clearly demonstrated in large economies.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the role of bundling in the optimal provision of multiple excludable public
goods in large economies. We show that bundling in the provision of unrelated public goods
can enhance social welfare. For a binary valuation parametric class of examples, we characterize
the optimal mechanism and show that allowing for bundling alleviates the well-known free riding
problem in large economies and increases the probability of public good provision. All these result
are related to the idea that bundling reduces the variance in the distribution of valuations.
While we solved for the optimal mechanism for the provision of multiple public goods in a very
speciﬁc example, the intuition highlighted in this paper that bundling of unrelated public goods
c a np l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h ee ﬃcient mechanism is more general. Under reasonable conditions,
bundling decreases the set of agents excluded from the public goods and it allows the mechanism
designer to collect more revenues, which in turn implies that public goods may be more likely
24provided.
We believe that there are two interesting directions the model of this paper could be extended.
First, can we characterize the optimal mechanism for the provision of multiple public goods when
the valuation distributions are more general? We believe that this is possible. In particular, as
long as all goods are binary and the problem is symmetric, a natural ordering of the types exist
no matter how many goods there are. While still very simplistic, this extension would allow an
analysis of how many diﬀerent bundles would be oﬀered, and one could also address to what extent
the mixing in the current paper is an artefact of the minimal type space. Secondly, it does not
seem crucial to have non-rivalness in all goods. One could therefore use our setup to ask to what
extent public provision of a private good could be rationalized as a way to alleviate the free-riding
problem in public good provision.
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A Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .













26that generates the same social surplus, where ρj : Θ → [0,1] is the provision rule for good j,
η
j
i : Θ → [0,1] is the inclusion rule for agent i and good j,and ti : Θ → R is the transfer rule for
agent i.
Proof. Consider an incentive feasible mechanism G.P i c kk ∈ [0,1] arbitrarily and deﬁne,





































for each θ ∈ Θ,j ∈ J and i ∈ I. This is a mechanism of the form in (A1), and we will call it G.
Use of the law of iterated expectations on ρj (θ) and ti (θi) shows that the feasibility constraint (5)
is unaﬀected when switching from G to G. It remains to show that the surplus is unchanged, and
that (4) and (6) continue to hold under G. The utility of agent i of type θi ∈ Θ who announces




























































































































Trivially, E−iti (θi)=ti (θi)=E −iτ (θ), which combined with (A5) and (A6) implies that the
payoﬀs in (A3) and (A4) are identical. Since the equality between (A3) and (A4) were established
27for any i, θi and ˆ θi it follows that all incentive and participation constraints (4) and (6) hold for









































































i (θ,x)θi − Cj (n)
#
. (A9)
Hence, G and G generate the same social surplus.
Claim A2 For every incentive feasible mechanism of the form (A1), there exists an anonymous
simple incentive feasible mechanism g of the form (8) that generates the same surplus.
Proof. Consider an incentive feasible simple mechanism G on form (A1). Let k ∈ {1,....,n!} denote
a generic permutation of the set of agents, I. Moreover, for any given θ ∈ Θ, let Pk (θ) ∈ Θ
denote the k-th permutation of θ (where the elements being permuted are (θ1,...,θn), that is, the
vectors of valuations are being permuted) and let P (θ)={P1 (θ),...,Pn! (θ)} be the set of all
possible permutations. Moreover, for every i ∈ I we let Pi
k (θ) ∈ Θ denote the type of agent i
in permutation Pk (θ),a n dχi
k ∈ I be the index of the agent who has valuation θi (the valuation






















(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θ,j∈ J,i∈ I,
tki (θi)=tχi
k(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θ,,i∈ I,
20To illustrate, suppose n =3 ,(θ1,θ 2,θ 3) = ((1,2),(3,2),(2,1)). Consider, for example, purmutation k given by
Pk (θ) = ((3,2),(1,2),(2,1)). Then P
1
k (θ)=( 3 ,2) and χ
1
k =2 .












































tki(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θ,i∈ I.
We now note that; (1) for each j ∈ J, e ρj (θ)=e ρj ¡
θ0¢


























k=1 are the same;




i0 (·). That is, the inclusion rules are the same














































k=1 are identical. Together, (1),(2) and (3) establishes that g is anonymous and
simple.
Now we show that e g is incentive feasible and generates the same expected surplus as G.F i r s t ,






















































































































































where the last equality follows from (A12). Hence the surplus generated by e g is identical to that
by original mechanism G. To show that e g is incentive feasible we ﬁrst note that Eρ
j





i∈I ti (θi) for all k, since the agents’ valuations are drawn from identical




e ti (θi) −
X
j∈J

























so e g is feasible if the original mechanism G is. Second, we note that incentive compatibility holds



















i − tki(b θi,θ−i) (A15)











































































































i − e t(b θi), (A16)
where the inequality follows from (A15). Hence g is incentive compatible. Finally, g also satisﬁes
the participation constraints because (see the second line in (A16)) all the permuted mechanisms
satisfy participation constraints. Proposition 1 follows by combining Claims A1 and A2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Notation: This proof requires us to be explicit about the coordinates of the vector θ when
permuting J. We therefore need some extra notation for this proof (only). We write θ
−j
i for a
type vector where good j has been removed. Analogously, θ−j stands for the type proﬁle with
good j coordinate removed for all agents and θj is the vector collecting the valuations for good









by removing agent i. These conventions are used also on the distributions, so, for example, F
−j
−i
denotes the cumulative distribution of θ
−j
−i. Conditional distributions are denoted in the natural








denotes the joint distribution of θ
−j
−i conditional on (vector) θ
j
−i. Since
no integrals are taken over subsets of the range of integration, we also conserve space and write
R
θ h(θ)dF(θ) rather than
R
θ∈Θ h(θ)dF(θ) when integrating a function h over θ and similarly for
integrals over various components of θ.
30Proof. Consider a simple anonymous incentive feasible mechanism g and, for k =1 ,...,m!, let























































By construction, each gk is simple. Each gk is also anonymous by the anonymity of g. Using



































































































































By exchangeability, the distribution of
¡
θ−j¢Pk is identical to the distribution of θ−j (also condi-
tional on the value of the jth argument) and the distribution of θ−j conditional on jth argument
being equal to θP
−1
k (j) is identical to the distribution of θ−P
−1
k (j) conditional on the P−1
k (j)th






















































k (j) ∈ ΘP−1





































































































































 − Et(θi) (A21)
,

















is thus unchanged when changing from g to gk. The same steps as in (A17) through (A20) (only
somewhat simpler) establishes that Eρ
j
k (θ)=E ρP−1















































so the feasibility constraint is unaﬀected when changing from g to gk. Next, write Write U(θi,θ0
i;g)
and U(θi,θ0
i;gk) for the expected utility from announcing θ0
i w h e nt h et r u et y p ei sθi in mechanisms































































































































































































32That is, the perceived probability of getting j when announcing θ0
i in mechanism gk is the same as
the perceived probability of getting good P−1















































































































































which establishes that type θi who announces θ0







¢Pk in mechanism g. Hence incentive compatibility and individual rationality
of gk follows from incentive compatibility and individual rationality of g. Now, construct a new
























































































































































θPk¢ = e ηj (θi)





= e t(θi), which together with (A27) and (A28)
establishes that e g is symmetric. To complete the proof we need to show that e g is incentive feasible
and generates the same surplus as g. We note that


































































e ρj (θ)e ηj (θi)θ
j


















i − tk (θi)






























































































































































































B yt h es a m ec a l c u l a t i o n ,U(θ;e g)= 1
m!
Pm!
k=1 U(θ;gk) ≥ 0, since all participation constraints hold
for each k. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
34Proof. [Part 1] Pick an arbitrary ε>0 and assume that there exists δ>0 and N<∞ such that
Eθ
j




















































Hence, for every ε>0 we can ﬁnd some N0 such that the probability that the ex post eﬃcient rule
provides good j is at least 1 − ε, which establishes part 1 of the claim. [Part 2] The argument is
symmetric and omitted.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Proof. [Part 1] Let ε ∈ (0,δ). S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sN such that Eθ
j
i −Cj (n)/n ≥ δ
for each j and n ≥ N we have that

















































for every n ≥ N. By the assumption that VARθ
j
i ≤ σ2 for every j we can apply Chebyshev’s
inequality to conclude that














→ 0 as m →∞ (A34)
Hence, there exists M such that Eb η
j
i (θi) ≥ 1 − ε

















































[µ + ε] > 0,
for m ≤ M, so (5) is satisﬁed. The remaining constraints hold trivially, so b g is incentive feasible.
[Part 2] Let ρ∗ =
©
ρ∗jªm
j=1 denote the ex post eﬃcient provision rules (transfers are irrelevant






i − Cj (n)
o
35denote the set of type proﬁles for which the ex post eﬃcient rule provides good j. The per capita













































































i when θi ∈ Bi and θ0
i / ∈ Bi. The per capita surplus generated by














































































































By applications of Chebyshev’s inequality Pr[Bi] → 1 and Pr
¡
Aj¢
→ 1 as n →∞ , which implies
that b s → s∗ as n →∞ . .
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
Proof. For each x ∈ X,j =1 ,2,θ i ∈ Θ we have that ρj (x) ∈ [0,1],η
j
θi ∈ [0,1]. Next, we note
that if tll < 0 and all constraints are satisﬁed, then a deviation where taxes are changed from t to
t0 =( thh,t hl,t lh,0) and where inclusion and provision rules are unchanged will satisfy all constraints
in the relaxed program (22). Similarly, if all constraints hold and tlh < −l − h the deviation
t0 =( thh,t hl,−l − h,max(0,t ll)) (A39)
satisﬁes all constraints (in the relaxed program). A symmetric argument restricts thl ≥− h − l.
Finally, if thh < −3h − l, then a deviation to
t0 =( −3h − l,max(thl,−l − h),max(tlh,−l − h),max(0,t ll)) (A40)
36Constraint Multiplier
Type hh IC (19a) λhh
Type hl (lh)I C( 1 9 b ) λhl
Type ll IR (20) λll
Feasibility (21) Λ
η1
θi ≥ 0 γθi
1 − η1
θi ≥ 0 φθi
ρ1 (x) ≥ 0 γ (x)
1 − ρ1 (x) ≥ 0 φ(x)
T a b l e2 :N o t a t i o no fm u l t i p l i e r s .
will leave all constraints satisﬁed. We conclude that there is a lower bound t > −∞ such that for
any mechanism where tθi <tfor some θi, there exists an alternative mechanism that supports the
same allocation (and therefore generates the same surplus) where tθi ≥ t. Also, if tθi > t =2 h for
some θi then at least one constraint in (22) must be violated. We therefore conclude that there is no




. All constraints and the objective function
are linear in the choice variables and therefore continuous so we conclude that the optimization
problem has a compact feasible set and a continuous objective. It is easy to check that the feasible
set is non-empty, which proves the claim by appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem.
Notation for optimality conditions to program (22).
The proofs that follow make direct use of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the optimization
problem (22). For easy reference, Table 2 summarizes our notation for the multipliers associated
with each constraint.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .












an−1 (x)ρ1(xhh +1 ,x hl,x lh,x ll)h + γhh − φhh = 0
γhhη1
hh =0 ,φ hh(1 − η1
hh)=0 ,γhh ≥ 0,φ hh ≥ 0. (A41)
All terms except γhh − φhh in the ﬁrst order condition are strictly positive, so γhh − φhh < 0.
The only possibility for this is that φhh > 0, which requires that η1
hh =1for the complementary
slackness constraint to be fulﬁlled. η2
hh =1follows from proposition 2.















an−1 (x)ρ1 (xhh,x hl +1 ,x lh,x ll)h + γhl − φhl =0 .
One checks that an (x)= n
xhlα(1 − α)an−1 (xhh,x hl − 1,x lh,x ll) holds for any x such that xhl ≥ 1











α(1 − α)an−1 (xhh,x hl − 1,x lh,x ll)ρ1 (x)h
xhl
n
= α(1 − α)h
X
x∈Xn:xhl≥1
an−1 (xhh,x hl − 1,x lh,x ll)ρ1 (x)
= α(1 − α)h
X
x∈Xn−1
an−1 (x)ρ1 (xhh,x hl +1 ,x lh,x ll). (A43)
By assumption,
P










x∈Xn−1 an−1 (x)ρ1 (xhh,x hl +1 ,x lh,x ll)
> 0.
Substituting (A43) into (A42) and using Lemma 3, we obtain the condition
2α(1 − α)h − λhhh + λhlh + b γ1
hl − b φ
1
hl =2 α(1 − α)h − α2Λh + α(2 − α)Λh + b γ1
hl − b φ
1
hl
=2 α(1 − α)h +2 αΛh + b γ1
hl − b φ
1
hl =0 . (A45)
By (A44), the “rescaled multipliers” are well-deﬁned, weakly positive, and equal to zero if and
only if the “original multiplier” is equal to zero. Since 2α(1 − α)h +2 αΛh>0, we conclude that
b φ
1
hl > 0. Hence η1
hl =1for all x by the complementarity slackness condition. By Proposition 2,
η2
lh =1follows. Steps 1 and 2 thus proves part (1) of the lemma.
[Step 3] To economize on derivations, we immediately observe that
X
x∈Xn−1
an−1 (x)ρ1(xhh,x hl,x lh +1 ,x ll)=
X
x∈Xn:xlh≥1
an−1(xhh,x hl,x lh − 1,x ll)ρ1(x), (A46)




x∈Xn an (x)ρ1 (x) xlh
n l − λhh
P
x∈Xn:xlh≥1 an−1(xhh,x hl,x lh − 1,x ll)ρ1(x)h
+λhl
P
x∈Xn:xlh≥1 an−1(xhh,x hl,x lh − 1,x ll)ρ1(x)l + γlh − φlh = 0.
(A47)
38Since an (x)= n






















= α(1 − α)l
X
x∈Xn:xlh≥1
an−1 (xhh,x hl,x lh − 1,x ll)ρ1 (x)
Substituting into (A47) and simplifying, one obtains
0=2 α(1 − α)l − λhhh + λhll + b γlh − b φlh =2 α(1 − α)l − α2hΛ +
¡
2α − α2¢
Λl + b γlh − b φlh
= α(1 − α)(1+Λ)
(










b γlh − b φlh
(1 + Λ)α(1 − α)
)
= α(1 − α)(1+Λ)
"
G(Φ)+
b γlh − b φlh
(1 +Λ)α(1 − α)
#
(A49)
where b γlh(x) and b φlh(x) are respectively γlh (x) and φlh(x) multiplied by 1/E
£
ρ1 (x)|θi = lh
¤
. We
thus conclude that G(Φ) > 0 must imply that b φlh > 0, hence by complementary slackness, η1
lh =1 .
Symmetrically, G(Φ) < 0 must imply that b γlh > 0, hence η1
lh =0 . If G(Φ)=0 , then the value
of both multipliers must be zero, which imposes no restrictions on η1
lh. Proposition 2 implies that
η2
hl = η1
lh, which completes the proof of part (2) of the lemma.
[Step 4] Finally, we consider the optimality condition for η1
ll. Using an identity similar to (A46),















an−1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1)ρ1(x)2l + γll − φll = 0. (A50)
Using the multinomial identity an (x)= n
xll (1 − α)
2 an−1 (xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1) we can rewrite the
ﬁrst order condition as
0=( 1 − α)







+ b γll − b φll
=( 1 − α)














2 (h + l)
#
+
b γll − φ
(1 − α)2(1+Λ)
)
=( 1 − α)
2 (1 + Λ)
·
H (Φ)+




where b γll and b φll are respectively γll and φll multiplied by 1/E
£
ρ1 (x)|θi = ll
¤
. Arguing as in the
previous case completes the proof.
39P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .


















hlan−1 (xhh,x hl − 1,x lh,x ll)h − η1





hlan−1 (xhh,x hl − 1,x lh,x ll)h + η1





llan−1 (xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1)(h + l)
¤
+ λll2η1
llan−1 (xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1)l
−Λan (x)2c + γ (x) − φ(x)=0 ,
(A52)
where the convention is that an−1 (xhh − 1,x hl,x lh,x ll)=0if xhh =0 , and so on. Using the
following identities between multinomials,


















exploiting the relationships between multipliers in Lemma 3, and substituting η1
hh = η1
hl =1due














n h − 1
α(1−α)
xhl


































where Φ = Λ/(1 + Λ). This condition can be interpreted as a weighted average of surplus (the
term multiplied by 1 − Φ) and proﬁt maximization (the terms multiplied by Φ). Collecting terms
in (A54) and simplifying we get
2xhh
n h +2xhl




z }| { ½













z }| { ½






















where the equality uses (from Lemma 4) that η1
lh =0if G(Φ) < 0 and η1
ll =0if H (Φ) < 0. The
result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .





¯ ¯ ≥  
¢
≤   for
every n ≥ N.






h − c if θi ∈ {hh,hl}
max{0,G(Φn)} − c if θi = lh
max{0,H(Φn)} − c if θi = ll
. (A56)
Since Yi (θi;Φn) has bounded support, there exists σ2 < ∞ such that the variance of Yi (θi;Φn) is
less than σ2 for any Φn ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, {Y (θi;Φn)}
n
i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
and
EθiYi (θi;Φn)=αh+α(1 − α)max{0,G(Φn)}+(1− α)
2 max{0,H(Φn)}−c = Q1 (µ,Φn). (A57)


































¯ ¯ ¯ ≥  
´
=P r



















¯ ¯ ≥  
¢
≤   for all n ≥ N = σ2/ 3 < ∞.
Lemma A2 Let Y be a random variable with Binomial (n,p) distribution. For any  >0 and




py (1 − p)
n−y ≤   (A60)
for every n ≥ N and y ∈ {0,...,n}.
Proof. Omitted.
Lemma A3 For every  >0 there exists N such that
¯ ¯ρ1
i (θi) − ρ1
i(θ0
i)
¯ ¯ ≤   for every θi,θ 0
i ∈ Θ in
any truth-telling mechanism for any economy where n ≥ N.
41Proof. Omitted.
The implication of Lemma A3 is as follows: as n →∞ , the perceived provision probability
of public goods are little aﬀected by agent i0s own announcement; thus such perceived provision
probability must be near the ex ante probability of providing the good.
Lemma A4 For every  >0,t h e r ee x i s t sN such that, for all n ≥ N,
¯ ¯Eρ1 (x) − ρ1
i (θi)
¯ ¯ ≤   for
all θi ∈ Θ in any truth-telling mechanism.
Proof. Fix  >0 arbitrarily. Let N be such that
¯ ¯ρ1
i (θi) − ρ1
i(θ0
i)
¯ ¯ ≤   for every n ≥ N,θi,θ 0
i ∈ Θ.
Then





i (hh)+α(1 − α)ρ1





i (ll) − ρ1
i(θi)
¯ ¯
≤ α2 ¯ ¯ρ1
i (hh) − ρ1
i(θ0
i)
¯ ¯ + α(1 − α)
¯ ¯ρ1





i (lh) − ρ1
i(θi)
¯ ¯ +( 1− α)
2 ¯ ¯ρ1
i (ll) − ρ1
i(θi)
¯ ¯
≤ α2  + α(1 − α)  + α(1 − α)  +( 1− α)
2   =  .
(Proof of Proposition 5). N o ww eu s et h ea b o v el e m m a st op r o v eP r o p o s i t i o n5.W ep r o v e
the four parts of the proposition in order.
(Part 1) We ﬁrst prove part 1. Note from (29), we know that Q1 (µ,Φn) ≥ αh − c for
any Φn ∈ [0,1], hence limn→∞ Q1 (µ,Φn) ≥ αh − c. Thus if αh > c, part 1 of the proposition
immediately follows from Lemmas 6 and A1. Suppose instead that α(2 − α)(h + l) > 2c ≥ 2αh.
Then,
Q1 (µ,Φn)=αh + α(1 − α)max{0,G(Φn)} +( 1− α)
2 max{0,H(Φn)} − c (A62)
≥ αh − c + α(1 − α)G(Φn)











=( 1 − Φn)[αh + α(1 − α)l − c]+Φn
·






αh + α(1 − α)l =





(h − l) >
α(2 − α)(l + h)
2
. (A63)
42Hence, Q1 (µ,Φn) ≥
α(2−α)(l+h)
2 − c>0 if α(2 − α)(h + l) > 2c, then for all Φn ∈ [0,1], implying
that limn→∞ Q1 (µ,Φn) > 0.Thus by Lemmas 6 and A1, limn→∞ Eρ
j
n (x) → 1 for j =1 ,2. This
proves part 1.
(Part 2) We now prove part 2. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a (sub) sequence
of optimal incentive compatible, balanced-budget voluntary mechanism with provision rules for
public good 1,ρ 1
n (x), such that limn→∞ Eρ1
n (x)=ρ>0. We will now derive a contradiction that
the mechanism can not have a balanced budget.
Now we can use the deﬁnition of ρ
j
i (θi) in (B90) to re-write the incentive compatibility constraint
(19b), after using the characterization of inclusion rule in Lemma 5, as
ρ1
i (hl)h + ρ1
i (lh)η1
lhl − thl ≥ ρ1
i (ll)η1
ll (h + l) − tll ≥ ρ1
i (ll)η1
ll (h − l), (A64)
where the second inequality comes from the participation constraint (20). Pick an arbitrary  >0.
Then, by Lemma A4, there exists ﬁnite N such that for every n ≥ N1 and each θi ∈ Θ,f o rj =1 ,2,
¯ ¯ ¯ρ
j
i (θi) − Eρ1
n (x)















n (x) −  1
¤
η1








































+3 h 1 |{z}
 
. (A66)









h + thl. (A67)


























































+  . (A68)
Finally, from the participation constraint (20), there exists N3 such that for all n>N 3,
tll < 2Eρ1
n (x)η1
lll +  . (A69)





hl = ηm ∈ (0,1). In this case, we have tll =0from type-
ll0s participation constraint. Using (A66)-(A69), we can bound the total expected tax revenue as
follows:
α2thh + α(1 − α)(thl + tlh)+( 1− α)
2 tll (A70)
<α 2 {Eρn (x)[(2− ηm)h + ηml]+ } +2 α(1 − α){Eρn (x)(h + ηml)+ }
=E ρn (x)
©£











α2 (2 − ηm)+2 α(1 − α)
¤














Z (1) = α(2 − α)(h + l) if 2αh ≤ α(2 − α)(h + l)
Z (0) = 2αh if 2αh > α(2 − α)(h + l),
which implies that
α2thh + α(1 − α)(thl + tlh)+( 1− α)
2 tll < Eρn (x)max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} +  0.
Thus if max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} < 2c, then the budget balance condition can not be satisﬁed
when n is suﬃciently large.
CASE 2: η1
ll = η2
ll = ηl ∈ (0,1),η1
lh = η2
hl =1 . We can again use (A66)-(A69) to bound the total
expected tax revenue as follows:
α2thh + α(1 − α)(thl + tlh)+( 1− α)
2 tll (A71)
<α 2 {Eρn (x)[(1− ηl)h +(1+ηl)l]+ } + α(1 − α)2Eρn (x){[h(1 − ηl)+( 1+ηl)l]+ }
+(1− α)
2 [2Eρn (x)ηll +  ]
=E ρn (x)
n£
α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤
(1 − ηl)h +
£
α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤













 +  
Note that Z2 (0) = α(2 − α)(h + l) and Z2 (1) = 2α(2 − α)l +2( 1− α)
2 l =2 l.S i n c e Z2 (ηl) is
linear in ηl, we have
Z2 (ηl) ≤ max{Z2 (0),Z 2 (1)} =m a x{α(2 − α)(h + l),2l}. (A72)
44If max{2αh,α(2 − α)(h + l)} < 2c, then max{α(2 − α)(h + l),2l} < 2c since by assumption
l<c .Therefore there exists N0 such that for all n>N 0, the budget balance condition will not be
satisﬁed under any incentive compatible voluntary mechanism.
(Part 3) Suppose to the contrary that there does not exist N such that η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl)=1
for all n ≥ N. Then, taking a subsequence if necessary, we have that η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl) < 1 for all
n, which, by Lemma 5, implies that η
j
n (ll)=0for all n in the sequence. The per capita surplus







(xhh + xhl)h +
¡
η1














=2[ αh + α(1 − α)l] − 2Eρ1
n (x)c
From Part 2, we know Eρ1
n (x) → 1 as n →∞ . Thus each ε>0 there exists N such that
S (Mn)
n
≤ 2[αh + α(1 − α)l − c]+ε. (A74)














α(2 − α)[h + l] − 2c
α(2 − α)[h + l] − 2l
e tn (hh)=e tn (hl)=e tn (lh)=( 1− η∗
ll)(h + l)+η∗
ll2l
e tn (ll)=2 η∗
lll
e ρj
n (x)=1 for all x ∈ Xn






n (ll)l −e tn (ll)=2 η∗
lll − 2η∗
lll =0 . (A76)





n (hl)h +e ρ2
n (x)e η2
n (hl)l − e tn (hl)
¤
= h + l − e tn (hl) (A77)
= h + l − [(1 − η∗
ll)(h + l)+η∗
ll2l]=η∗






n (hl)h + e ρ2
n (x)e η2
n (hl)l − e tn (hl)
¯ ¯θi = ll
¤
.
Similarly, the downward incentive constraints and participation constraints for all other types of













 =0 . (A78)






= α22h +2 α(1 − α)(h + l)+( 1− α)
2 η∗
ll2l − 2c (A79)
=2 [ αh + α(1 − α)l − c]+( 1− α)
2 η∗
ll2l
Let ε =( 1− α)
2 η∗
lll>0, we know from (A74) that there exists N<∞ such that
S (Mn)
n













which implies that mechanisms Mn could not be optimal for n ≥ N, a contradiction.
N o ww eh a v ec o n c l u d e dt h a ti nt h es e q u e n c e{Mn},η 1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl)=1for every n ≥ N.
What is left to show is that η1
n (ll) does converge to η∗
ll in the sequence {Mn}. Suppose ﬁrst that
there exists a subsequence such that η1
n (ll) → η0 <η ∗
ll. An argument as the one above shows that,





αh + α(1 − α)l +( 1− α)
2 η0l − c
i
+ ε. (A81)




constructed above. Pick ε =
(1 − α)
2 (η∗


















thus again contradicts the optimality of the mechanism Mn is better when n is suﬃciently large.
Finally, suppose there is a subsequence such that η
j
n (ll) → η0 >η ∗
ll. We now argue that such a
mechanism could not be budget balanced. Let
ε =
(η0 − η∗





n (ll) → 2η0 it follows that to satisfy the participation constraint for type ll
for all n t h e r em u s tb es o m eN1 such that tn (ll) ≤ 2η0l + ε for all n ≥ N1. Moreover, there exists
N2 such that η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl)=1 for n ≥ N2. Thus the incentive constraint that type hl does not
imitate type ll reduces to
ρ1
in (hl)h + ρ2
in (hl)l − tn (hl) ≥ ρ1
in (ll)η1
n (ll)h + ρ2
in (ll)η2
n (ll)l − tn (ll)
⇒ tn (hl) ≤ tn (ll)+
£
ρ1












46By Lemma A3, limn→∞ ρ
j
in (hl)=l i m n→∞ ρ
j
in (hl)=l i m n→∞ Eρ
j
n (x)=1 . This, together with the
assumption that limn→∞ η1
n (ll)=η0, implies that there exists N3 such that
tn (hl) ≤ tn (ll)+
¡
1 − η0¢
(h + l)+ε. (A84)
Similarly, the incentive constraint that type hh does not announce hl implies that tn (hh) ≤ tn (hl)+
ε. Hence, the expected per capita revenue of the mechanism satisﬁes
α2tn (hh)+2 α(1 − α)tn (hl)+( 1− α)
2 tn (ll) (A85)
≤
£
α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤















α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤¡
1 − η0¢
(h + l)+2 αε
≤ 2η0l + ε +
£
α2 +2 α(1 − α)
¤¡
1 − η0¢




α(2 − α)(h + l)+ε(1 + 2α).






c ≥ 2c − ε, we have
α2tn (hh)+2 α(1 − α)tn (hl)+( 1− α)


















(2l − α(2 − α)(h + l)) +
(η0 − η∗




ll)[α(2 − α)(h + l) − 2l]
2
< 0.
Hence, the mechanism must violate the balanced-budget constraint for n ≥ max{N1,N 2,N 3,N 4}.
We conclude that there can be no subsequence of optimal mechanisms such that η
j
n (ll) → η0 6= η∗
ll,
proving the claim.
(Part 4) This part is proved analogous to Part 3. Suppose to the contrary that in the
sequence of mechanisms {Mn}, there exists no N such that η1
n (ll)=η2
n (ll)=0for all n ≥ N.
Then there must be a subsequence where η1
n (ll)=η2
n (ll) > 0, which from Lemma (5) we know that
η1
n (lh)=η2
n (hl)=1for all n along the subsequence. Hence limn→∞ η1
n (lh)=l i m n→∞ η2
n (hl)=
1 and limn→∞ η1
n (ll)=l i m n→∞ η2
n (ll)=η0 ≥ 0. Let
ε =
2c − α(2 − α)(h + l)
4(1+α)
> 0. (A87)
We can then use the same calculations as in Part 3 to conclude that there exists N<∞ such that
the revenues collected satisfy
α2tn (hh)+2 α(1 − α)tn (hl)+( 1− α)
2 tn (ll) < η02l +
¡
1 − η0¢
α(2 − α)(h + l)+ε(1 + 2α)
≤ α(2 − α)(h + l)+ε(1 + 2α). (A88)






c ≥ 2c − ε, hence
α2tn (hh)+2 α(1 − α)tn (hl)+( 1− α)







≤ α(2 − α)(h + l)+ε(2 + 2α) − 2c = −
2c − α(2 − α)(h + l)
2
< 0,
violating the balanced-budget constraint. Establishing that limn→∞ η1
n (lh) = limn→∞ η2
n (hl)=η∗
lh
proceeds along the same lines as those in Part 3.
48BO m i t t e d P r o o f s
Lemma A2 Let Y be a random variable with Binomial (n,p) distribution. For any  >0 and




py (1 − p)
n−y ≤  
for for every n ≥ N and y ∈ {0,...,n}.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary  >0. The most probable value for y is the unique integer y∗ (n) satisfying
np − 1 ≤ y∗ (n) ≤ np +1 , and the corresponding probability is
Pr(y∗ (n)) =
n!
y∗ (n)![n − y∗ (n)]!


















[n − y∗ (n)]! = s(n − y∗ (n))
√





y∗ (n)![n − y∗ (n)]!
=
s(n)
























Note that for any p ∈ (0,1),limn→∞ y∗ (n)=∞ and limn→∞ [n − y∗ (n)] = ∞. Hence, there exists
N<∞ such that y∗ (n) ≥ R( ) and n−y∗ (n) ≥ R( ), implying that s(n) ≤ 1+ , s(y∗ (n)) ≥ 1− ,
















(1 +  )







2 [n − y∗ (n)]
n−y∗(n)+ 1
2
py∗(n) (1 − p)
n−y∗(n)
=
(1 +  )
(1 −  )
2














Since y∗ (n)/n =a r gm a x p∈[0,1] py∗(n) (1 − p)
n−y∗(n) , we know that











(1 +  )















(1 +  )









1 − p − 1
n
¢ → 0 as n →∞ .
Hence, there exists N0 < ∞ such that
(1 +  )









1 − p − 1
n
¢ ≤  .









be agent i0s perceived probability that public good j will be provided when agent i announces
type θi. The following lemma shows that as n →∞ , agent i0s announcement would not aﬀect
the perceived probability of provision, i.e., the probability of any individual agent being pivotal
approaches zero as n →∞:
Lemma A3 For every  >0 there exists N such that
¯ ¯ρ1
i (θi) − ρ1
i(θ0
i)
¯ ¯ ≤   for every θi,θ0
i ∈
Θ in any truth-telling mechanism for any economy where n ≥ N.
2Proof. We only prove the result for (θi,θ0
i)=( hh,ll). The proof for other type combinations
p r o c e e ds t e pb ys t e pi nt h es a m ew a ya n da r el e f tt ot h er e a d e r .U s i n gt h en o w - s t a n d a r dr e c u r s i v e















ρ1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll +1 )
¤
.
Let ρ1 maximize the diﬀerence between ρ1
i (hh) and ρ1
i (ll) and let ρ1
i (hh) and ρ1
i (ll) be the perceived
provision probabilities when the provision rule is ρ1. That is,






ρ1(xhh +1 ,x hl,x lh,x ll) − ρ1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll +1 )
¤
, (B91)





1 if an−1(xhh − 1,x hl,x lh,x ll) ≥ an−1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1)
0 if an−1(xhh − 1,x hl,x lh,x ll) < a−1(xhh,x hl,x lh,x ll − 1).
(B92)













Fix an arbitrary  >0 and let m = xhl + xlh ≤ n − 1. Since m is a binomial random variable with












for every n ≥ N. Moreover, conditional on m, xhh is binomially distributed with parameters
p0 = α2/[1 − 2α(1 − α)] and n − 1 − m. Thus, we know from (B93) that, conditional on m, there
exists a single value xhh (m) such that ρ1(xhh (m)+1,x hl,x lh,x ll)=1and ρ1(xhh (m),x hl,x lh,x ll+
1) = 0; and for all other realizations the of xhh, the provision probability is unaﬀected by agent i0s
announcement. Lemma A2 implies that there exists N0 < ∞ such that




for all n such that n − 1 − m ≥ N0.





< ∞. Then, N0 ≤ (n − 1)[1 − 2α(1 − α) −  ] for all
n ≥ n∗. Hence, for all n ≥ n∗,
Pr[n − 1 − m ≤ N0]=P r[ m ≥ (n − 1) − N0]









where the last equality follows from (B94). Hence, for n ≥ n∗,n− 1 − m ≤ N0 with probability of
at least 1 −  /2. Thus, for n ≥ n∗,
ρ1









m=0 Pr(m)Pr(xhh = xhh (m)|m)
=
Pn−1−N0
m=0 Pr(m)Pr(xhh = xhh (m)|m)+
Pn−1
m=n−N0 Pr(m)Pr(xhh = xhh (m)|m)
≤
Pn−1−N0





2 Pr[n − 1 − m ≥ N0]+P r[ n − 1 − m ≤ N0] ≤  
(B97)
where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of xhh (m);the ﬁrst inequality follows from
(B95); and the last inequality follows from (B96).
Similarly, let ρ1 solve










i (hh) and ρ1
i (ll) be the associated perceived provision probabilities when the provision












which is just reversing of provision rule ρ1. Hence, conditional on m, ρ1(xhh (m)+1,x hl,x lh,x ll)=0
and ρ1(xhh (m),x hl,x lh,x ll +1)=1;and for all other values for xhh, agent i0s announcement does
not aﬀect the provision probability. It thus immediately follows from out previous calculations that
ρ1




Pr(m)Pr(xhh = xhh (m)|m) ≥−  . (B100)
It follows from (B97) and (B100) that, for any conceivable provision rule,
−  ≤ ρ1
i (hh) − ρ1
i (ll) ≤ ρ1
i (hh) − ρ1
i (ll) ≤ ρ1
i (hh) − ρ1
i (ll) ≤  .
4